A major terrorist attack from across the border has once again plunged our nation into a crisis, provoking nationwide anger. This time it is the cynical murder of 26 tourists in Pahalgam. But we have seen this movie once too often, with antecedents going back to the 1980s and 1990s.
The script is tiresomely familiar: Islamist groups created, armed, trained, and guided from Pakistan, often directed by the ISI, kill innocents in India; Pakistani authorities deny involvement even as groups based on its soil “take credit” for the attacks; the world denounces the crime; India’s response is carefully calibrated so as not to provoke a larger war; and after a period of tension, everyone settles back to business-as-usual. Until it happens again.
This pattern cannot be repeated forever.
Over the past three decades, there have been numerous instances of terrorist attacks in India linked to Pakistan-based terror groups. The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) stars in most of them, along with the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and hybrid offshoots calling themselves names like the People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF) and The Resistance Front (TRF), with a guest-artiste appearance for the “Indian Mujahideen”.
The TRF claimed responsibility for Pahalgam, then withdrew the claim in the face of worldwide condemnation. But the denials are disbelieved because of the litany of Pakistani-directed terrorist attacks this century following the Kargil conflict (from May-July 1999 into 2000).
A partial list of just the most significant episodes makes for painful reading:
Chattisinghpora Massacre, 2000
On March 20, 2000, in the village of Chattisinghpora, Anantnag district, Jammu and Kashmir, 15-17 LeT gunmen entered the village and ordered all Sikh men and boys to assemble at the village gurdwara. Thirty-five of them were systematically shot and killed. The massacre occurred on the eve of the then US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India, and was clearly meant to send a signal.
Indian Parliament Attack, 2001
On December 13, 2001, terrorists from JeM and LeT attacked the Indian parliament, resulting in the deaths of 14 people.
Kaluchak Massacre, 2002
On May 14, 2002, near Kaluchak in Jammu and Kashmir, three LeT militants dressed in combat uniforms attacked a Himachal Road Transport Corporation bus traveling from Manali to Jammu, killing seven passengers. They then entered the family quarters of an Indian Army camp and fired indiscriminately, killing 23 people, including 10 children, eight women, and five army personnel. The attack resulted in a total of 31 deaths and 47 injuries.
Akshardham Temple Attack, 2002
On September 24, 2002, LeT attacked a Hindu temple in Gujarat, resulting in over 30 deaths.
Delhi Bombings, 2005
On October 29, 2005, LeT and associated groups triggered multiple bombs across Delhi, killing over 60 people.
Mumbai Train Bombings, 2006
On July 11, 2006, LeT terrorists set off several bombs on local trains, killing over 200 people.
Mumbai Attacks, 2008
On November 26, 2008, 10 members of LeT carried out coordinated shootings and bombings across Mumbai, killing 175 people and injuring over 300. The attack lasted till November 29, when the terrorists were all killed and one, Ajmal Kasab, was captured alive. The attackers were proven to be trained and directed by Pakistani military and intelligence agencies.
German Bakery Bombing, 2010
An LeT terrorist attack on the popular German Bakery in Koregaon Park, Pune, on February 13, 2010 killed 17 people and injured over 60 others. An LeT offshoot calling itself the “Indian Mujahideen” claimed responsibility, even though it was widely assumed to be a front for Pakistan.
Pathankot Airbase Attack, 2016
On January 2-5, 2016, militants from JeM attacked the Pathankot Airbase in Punjab, leading to the deaths of seven Indian security personnel.
Uri Attack, 2016
On September 18, 2016, near the town of Uri in Jammu and Kashmir, four JeM terrorists attacked an Indian Army brigade headquarters. The attackers lobbed 17 grenades in three minutes, causing significant damage. The attack resulted in the deaths of 19 Indian soldiers and injuries to up to 30 others. It was one of the deadliest attacks on Indian security forces in Kashmir in two decades.
Pulwama Attack, 2019
On February 14, 2019, a suicide bomber from JeM targeted a convoy of Indian paramilitary personnel in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir, killing 40 jawans.
India’s strategy to respond effectively to such cross-border terrorism has gradually evolved. In 2001, in response to the Indian parliament attack, India mobilised its military forces along the border with Pakistan in a standoff known as Operation Parakram. Although it did not lead to a direct military action, it was a significant show of force. But in 2008, after 26/11, India decided against a military response, focusing instead on diplomatic efforts to isolate Pakistan internationally and on increased counter-terrorism measures within the country.
The 2016 Pathankot attack came within a week of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore to attend Pakistani leader Nawaz Sharif’s birthday celebrations and his granddaughter’s wedding. So disbelieving was New Delhi that Pakistan could have reciprocated its friendship in such a manner that the government even invited Pakistan to be associated with the inquiry into the attack. The Pakistani “experts” who came to India went back and claimed that “the Indians had done it to themselves”. That was the last straw.
Hardened by betrayal, India turned its face against any further accommodation with the killer-despatchers across the border. Its responses became tougher: After Pathankot, India conducted a series of counter-terror operations in Jammu and Kashmir and increased security measures at key installations.
After Uri, India carried out surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) on September 29, 2016, targeting militant launchpads in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). And after Pulwama, India conducted an airstrike on February 26, 2019, targeting a JeM training camp in Balakot, Pakistan – the first time Indian warplanes penetrated Pakistani airspace since the 1971 war.
What could it do to avenge Pahalgam?
There is no doubt that military retribution will follow. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made that amply clear to the world. Despite addressing an audience in the Hindi heartland of Bihar, he declared in English – for the benefit of the global audience – that “India will identify, track and punish every terrorist and their backers and we will pursue them to the ends of the Earth,” promising “a punishment bigger than they can imagine.”
The nation demands it, and stands solidly behind the government as it weighs its options to make Pakistan pay for orchestrating the massacre.
It may not be a surgical strike of commandos going behind enemy lines to take out terror nests as was done after Uri. Or a rerun of an aerial attack deep inside Pakistan’s Balakot. And though some military action is inevitable, it will not be purely military.
Ever since the December 2001 terrorist attack on our parliament, the template has been clear. As then-foreign minister Jaswant Singh wrote, the objectives were: to send a message to Pakistan, to contain Islamabad diplomatically, and to defeat terrorism on the ground. To this end, he wrote, the internal challenge “was to carry the nation’s mood, to contain its belligerence, its desire for revenge and retaliation, but to give it a sense of achievement.” The external challenge was “to carry conviction with and thus carry the opinion of the international community.”
Any Indian response to Pahalgam will therefore involve a mix of measures targeting Pakistan, the international community, and domestic public opinion. India’s message must teach Pakistan’s military leadership that their criminal behaviour will exact a heavy price.
The Balakot airstrike let terrorists and their masters know that India has the will to pursue them deep inside Pakistan and would not shy away from using its military might. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said at the time: “Our approach to terrorism was and will remain a judicious combination of clinical military action and [a] mature and responsible diplomatic outreach.”
Our response to Pahalgam must again be the same. One problem is that the relationship between the two countries is already so bad that there is not much more that India can do of a non-military nature to convey its disapproval of Pakistan.
At the time of Pahalgam, the two countries had no high commissioners in place; a total absence of high-level contacts; diplomatic relations downgraded and respective high commissions downsized; a ban on trade; a freeze on civil society, cultural and sporting contacts; and a shutdown of all usual modes of travel such as bus, train, or flights between the two countries.
To this, India has now added several diplomatic actions, including suspending (“keeping in abeyance”) the 64-year-old the Indus Waters Treaty, scaling down diplomatic missions by expelling more Pakistani diplomats, ending visa services for Pakistani nationals, closing the Attari-Wagah border and ordering Pakistani citizens, including those with Indian relatives and those here for medical treatment, to leave the country.
Yet, the 2021 ceasefire along the LoC was not formally revoked (even though it has already begun to fray, with increased reports of cross-border firing). And the Kartarpur corridor for Sikh pilgrims was not shut. This signals a measured strategy-assertive and resolute but not reckless or impulsive.
Pakistan has responded predictably, by mirroring all these actions, closing airspace to Indian aircraft, and threatening to abandon past treaties, including the Simla Agreement.
Indian security forces have also intensified operations against terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir, demolishing houses linked to terrorists. This crackdown is part of a broader effort to address the threat posed by groups with alleged ties to Pakistan.
What else can be done?
India could conduct surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) targeting militant launch pads in POK. Our air force could target terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Pakistan. A larger air-strike than Balakot is one possibility; targeted missile attacks on the terrorists’ handlers and their bases in Pakistan, another.
While an overt message needs to be sent, covert operations will also have to be enhanced. Key militant leaders and infrastructure within Pakistan cannot be allowed to feel secure.
India must also employ cyber warfare tactics to disrupt militant communications and operations. Though the previous operations involved deploying only the Army and IAF, the Navy’s assets can easily be mobilized and deployed in the northern reaches of the Arabian Sea, in international waters, to pressure Pakistani merchant shipping, leading to higher insurance premiums for trade with that country. Squeezing an economy already in meltdown will hit the Pakistani elite where it hurts.
Diplomatically, New Delhi will rally international support to pressure Pakistan’s military establishment. Promoting sanctions against identified military officials may not be easy, but public exposure of the ISI terror nexus in international forums should isolate Pakistan diplomatically and add to the opprobrium the Pakistani military endured after the Osama Bin Laden episode.
Beyond external responses, India must fortify its domestic security apparatus, particularly in Kashmir. The objective transcends mere deterrence; it encompasses reassurance. Both tourists (who must be encouraged to keep coming) and residents must feel secure.
In the short term, an expanded security footprint may be inevitable. But it should be deployed with sensitivity and concern for the well-being of the ordinary people of Kashmir, most of whom are victims, not accomplices, of the terrorists claiming to be acting in their name.
The successful elections in Jammu and Kashmir marked a significant milestone in restoring democratic legitimacy. This momentum must be sustained. Equally, the contagion of communalism must be firmly curbed. Hate crimes against Kashmiris, or attacks on Indian Muslims, will only serve the terrorists’ aims.
The horror of Pahalgam serves as a stark reminder that the policy of “benign neglect” that India had pursued towards Pakistan will not work indefinitely. We need to be tough in order to both punish and deter transgressions from their side. We need to be decisive enough to prove to the malign men in uniform who run Pakistan that violence in Kashmir will yield them no rewards.
And then – but only then – we need to engage again with those in Pakistan who understand that they have no choice but to learn to live in peace with India.
Sadly, that day is not yet here.
(Shashi Tharoor has been a Member of Parliament from Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, since 2009. He is a published author and a former diplomat.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
